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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

: Case No. 920379-CA

v,

:

JASON EWELL

: Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

:

PETITION FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
Did the Court err by grafting onto the firearm
enhancement statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(4) (1990), a
requirement that a defendant must "later" be convicted of the
second firearm felony in order for his sentence to be enhanced?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In one information, defendant was charged with one
count of aggravated robbery.

In a second unrelated information,

he was charged with one count of aggravated robbery, one count of
theft, and one count of theft by deception.
The first count of aggravated robbery was tried to a
jury, which returned a verdict of guilty.

Prior to sentencing on

this count, defendant pled guilty to the other aggravated robbery
count, and the court dismissed the remaining charges.
The court sentenced defendant on both counts of
aggravated robbery on February 28, 1992. Defendant received a
five to life sentence on the jury verdict; he then received a
five to life sentence on the guilty plea.

The court then added a

five year enhancement to the first sentence pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated 76-3-203(4) (1990).
In an opinion issued August 17, 1993, this Court
reversed the five year enhancement and affirmed the court's order
in all other respects.

State v. Ewell, No. 920379-CA (Utah App.

August 17, 1993) (Addendum A ) .
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are accurately set out in the Court's
opinion.

Ewell, No. 920379-CA, slip op. at 1-3.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The firearm enhancement statute provides for

enhancement of the sentence of a "person who has been sentenced
to a term of imprisonment for a felony in which a firearm was
used . . . and is convicted of another felony when a firearm was
used . . . "

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(4) (1990).

There is no

requirement that the first sentence must precede the second
conviction; all that is required is that defendant "has been
sentenced" and ".is convicted" (emphasis added) .
The lead and concurring opinions of the Court construe
"convicted" as used in this statute to refer to a finding of
guilt.

Under this definition, defendant was "convicted" twice

and then sentenced twice; thus, his second "conviction" did not
chronologically follow his first sentence.
does not require this sequence.

However, the statute

Since defendant was sentenced on

one count and stood convicted of the other, the requirements of
the statute were met and the enhancement correctly imposed.
2

ARGUMENT
THIS COURT ERRED IN GRAFTING ONTO THE FIREARM
ENHANCEMENT STATUTE A REQUIREMENT THAT A
DEFENDANT MUST BE "LATER" CONVICTED OF THE
SECOND FIREARM FELONY IN ORDER TO ENHANCE HIS
SENTENCE
The lead and concurring opinions in this case found
that the trial court violated the terms of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3203(4) (1990).

That section reads, in pertinent part:

Any person who has been sentenced to a
term of imprisonment for a felony in which a
firearm was used . . . and is convicted of
another felony when a firearm was used . . .
shall, in addition to any other sentence
imposed, be sentenced for an indeterminate
term to be not less than five nor more than
ten years to run consecutively and not
concurrently.
The lead opinion read into this section a requirement of
chronological sequence:
Ewell argues that the statute applies only
where one, who has been sentenced for a
firearm felony, is later convicted of another
firearm felony. Ewell claims that both
convictions preceded the sentencing.
Therefore, there was no second or subsequent
conviction involving a firearm to trigger
this section.
Ewell, slip op. at 5 (lead opinion) (original emphasis deleted;
emphasis added).

The concurring opinion tacitly adopted this

sequence requirement.

Id. at 7 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("The

legislature chose to require that a person be 'sentenced' to a
term of imprisonment and then be 'convicted' of another felony
using a firearm before the enhanced penalty would be imposed"
(emphasis added)).

3

However, the plain language of the statute contains no
sequence requirement.

The only statutory requirement for the

enhancement to apply is that a person "who has been sentenced to
a term of imprisonment for a felony in which a firearm was used .
. . is convicted of another felony when a firearm was used."
Utah Code Ann. § 7(5-3-203(4) (1990).

These requirements were met

in this case. After defendant was sentenced pursuant to the jury
verdict, he was also "convicted" of the guilty plea.
This result obtains even if, as the concurrence states,
"a defendant [is] "convicted' upon the establishment of guilt,
not upon sentencing," Ewell, slip op. at 8 (Jackson, J.
concurring).
Had the legislature intended the result reached by the
Court, it could easily have included the word "subsequently" or
"later" before the word "convicted" in the statute.

Since the

statute is susceptible to a rational and just interpretation as
written, the additional terms should not be judicially grafted
on. See Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co, v. Public Serv. Comm'n.
107 Utah 502, 155 P.2d 184, 185 (Utah 1945) (statutory
interpretation "must be based on the language used, . . . and the
court has no power to rewrite a statute to make it conform to an
intention not expressed").
Applying the statute as written requires affirming the
sentence enhancement imposed by the trial court.

This result

also creates a more reasonable rule for the future.

Courts

frequently aggregate "convictions" for a single sentencing.
4

No

interest is served by requiring a trial court to sentence a
defendant on one count before accepting his guilty plea on a
second count, on peril of relieving the defendant of a firearm
enhancement.
CONCLUSION
This Court should grant rehearing and modify its
opinion to affirm the trial court's imposition of the firearm
enhancement.
CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH
Pursuant to 35(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
this petition is presented in good faith and not for delay.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 2 J _ day of August, 1993.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

ElpERP^M/ORWS,
stant Attorney General

CERTIFICTTETOF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Petition for Rehearing were mailed, postage
prepaid, to CHARLES F. LLOYD, JR. and ELIZABETH HOLBROOK, SALT
LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, Attorneys for Appellant, 424
East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah
day of August, 1993.
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(For Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellee,
Case No. 920379-CA

v.
Jason Ewell,
Defendant and Appellant.

F I L E D
(August 17, 1993)

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable James S. Sawaya
Attorneys:

Charles F. Loyd# Jr. and Elizabeth Holbrook, Salt
Lake City, for Appellant
Jan Graham and Charlene Barlow, Salt Lake City,
for Appellee

Before Judges Bench, Garff, and Jackson.
GARFF, Judge:
Appellant, Jason Ewell, appeals his convictions of
aggravated robbery, claiming the trial court should have granted
a mistrial due to a juror's possibly prejudicial statement during
voir dire and claiming the court misapplied the firearm
enhancement statute. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
On December 12, 1991, Ewell was tried to a jury on one count
of aggravated robbery. On the second day of the jury trial
before Judge Sawaya, defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the
basis that he had just learned that one of the jurors, Jeffrey
Bogaard, had been excused for cause from Judge Rokich's courtroom
two days earlier due to Bogaard's statement during voir dire that
a defendant's choice not to testify might affect his decision.
In the earlier trial, Judge Rokich stated, "Now, there's a jury
instruction to the effect—that will be given to those finally
chosen—that the defendant does not have to testify if he doesn't
desire to do so. Would you hold that against him, if he didn't
testify?" Bogaard responded, "I'm not sure if it would sway my
opinion one way or another. I would want—depends on the course
of the trial, it might sway me. I have no opinion one way or

another. Depending on what comes out, it might have an effect."
Shortly after giving this answer, Bogaard listened to Judge
Rokich lecture him on a defendant's constitutional right to
remain silent and on the presumption of innocence.
In the second trial, Judge Sawaya explained:
Under the law, ladies and gentlemen, a
defendant charged with a criminal offense is
presumed to be innocent until he's been
proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. If
the evidence doesn't rise to that level then
your duty as jurors would be to return a
verdict of not guilty. The defendant has the
right to remain silent meaning he doesn't
have to take the stand and testify unless he
wishes to. The Defendant may be satisfied
with the evidence presented by the state and
feel that there's nothing to add to it. Are
there any of you who feel you cannot afford
to the defendant the benefit of the
presumption of innocence and his right to
remain silent?
No jurors responded.
Defense counsel challenged for cause the continued seating
of Bogaard, arguing that the juror's answers were inconsistent
and that therefore he may have been dishonest when he answered
Judge Sawaya's question, and thus the juror's ability to be fair
was questionable. The judge denied the motion, stating that
during the voir dire in the present case, he had Minstructed [the
jurors] and part of that was that the defendant has a right not
to testify and that his failure to testify is not a circumstance
that you can hold against him and no presumptions against him can
be raised.11 The court concluded that "I am satisfied that Mr.
Bogaard and all the members of this panel are willing to follow
the law of the case as I state it and that no adverse presumption
would be raised against the defendant." The jury found Ewell
guilty as charged.
In a separate case, Ewell pleaded guilty to one count of
aggravated robbery on January 12, 1992. On February 28, 1992,
the court sentenced Ewell for both convictions as follows: one
term of five years to life with a one year firearm enhancement
for the first conviction, another term of five years to life with
a one year firearm enhancement on the second conviction, and an
additional five year firearm enhancement because vEwell had been
convicted of two crimes involving firearms. Ewefl appealed both
cases, claiming the court erred in failing to grant a mistrial
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due to juror bias, and in misapplying the five-year firearm
enhancement statute. This court consolidated the appeals.
MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD
Initially, we address Ewell#s motion to supplement the
record with the transcript of the voir dire in Judge Rokich's
courtroom in State v. Ramirez, two days before Ewell's trial.
The State does not object to this court taking judicial notice of
the portion of the Ramirez transcript pertaining to this case.1
Given that the parties do not dispute the contents of the
transcript, we grant the motion to supplement the record with the
portion of the Ramirez transcript regarding Bogaard's voir dire.
MISTRIAL
We next consider the State's claim that Ewell waived his
claim that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a
mistrial because defense counsel failed to ask the court to
interrogate Bogaard about his voir dire answer. In McDonouah
Power Eauip.. Inc. v. Greenwood. 464 U.S. 548, 104 S. Ct. 845
(1984), the Court stated in a footnote that if a party thinks a
voir dire answer is factually incorrect at the time of a voir
dire examination and the party chooses not to interrogate the
juror further regarding the voir dire answer, the party would be
barred from later challenging the composition of the jury. !£.
at 550 n.2, 104 S. Ct. at 847 n.2.

The State claims that under McDonouah. counsel must ask the
court to interrogate the juror in order to preserve the issue on
appeal. We disagree. First, the Court in McDonouah did not base
its holding on the waiver issue. Therefore, the statements in
the McDonouah footnote are dicta. Second, in this case, defense
counsel was not aware that Bogaard's voir dire response was
possibly inconsistent with a previous response until after voir
dire had concluded. Therefore, McDonouah does not require this
court to bar Ewell from raising his claim that the trial court
erred in denying his motion for a mistrial.
As a general rule, an attorney must timely object in a
clear and concise manner. State v. Schreuder. 726 P.2d 1215,
1. Rule 201(b)(2), Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that a
judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable
dispute in that it is . . . capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned.99
19
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1222 (Utah 1986). In this case, defense counsel moved for a
mistrial on the basis that Bogaard's ability to be fair was
questionable. Thus, the defense counsel alerted the court to the
issue. Because the objection was timely, clear, and concise, we
hold that Ewell is not barred from raising the issue on appeal.
We next address whether the trial court erred in failing to
grant a mistrial due to Bogaard's differing responses during voir
dire in Judge Rokich's courtroom and later in Judge Sawaya's
courtroom. To determine whether a juror, challenged for
answering falsely on voir dire, should be excused, we apply the
two-prong McDonouah test. State v. Thomas. 830 P.2d 243, 245
(Utah 1992) (referring to the test outlined in McDonouah, 464
U.S. at 556, 104 S. Ct. at 850). Under the McDonouah test, a
moving party is entitled to a new trial if the party demonstrates
that (l) "a juror failed to answer honestly a material question
on voir dire," and (2) Ma correct response would have provided a
valid basis for a challenge for cause.11 McDonouah, 464 U.S. at
556, 104 S. Ct. at 850.
Here, Bogaard had earlier been excused for cause from Judge
Rokich's courtroom based on his answer to the judge's voir dire
question as to whether Bogaard would hold it against the
defendant if he did not testify. Bogaard did not absolutely
state that he would hold it against the defendant. Instead, he
said he was not sure whether it would sway his opinion. He then
said he had no opinion on the subject. Shortly after this
answer, Bogaard listened to Judge Rokich lecture him on a
defendant's constitutional right to remain silent and on the
presumption of innocence.
Judge Sawaya's question, while similar to that asked by
Judge Rokich, was more extensive and contained more information
about a defendant's right not to testify and the presumption of
innocence. Briefly, Judge Sawaya informed the jury that a
defendant has the right to remain silent, does not have to
testify, and is nevertheless presumed innocent. Given the
difference between the two questions and the two lectures,
Bogaard's answer does not appear dishonest. See McDonouah, 464
U.S. at 556, 104 S. Ct. at 850. We therefore need not reach the
second prong of the McDonouah test.
We conclude that the trial court did not err in failing to
either conduct further investigation or grant Ewell's motion for
a mistrial.
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ENHANCEMENT
The remaining issue is whether the trial court erred in
imposing the additional five year firearm enhancement pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-203(4) (1990)•
Ewell claims the trial court misconstrued this statute when
it assessed a mandatory five year enhancement for a second
conviction involving a firearm. Ewell argues that the statute
applies only where one, who has been sentenced for a firearm
felony, is later convicted of another firearm felony. Ewell
claims that both convections preceded the sentencing. Therefore,
there was no second or subsequent conviction involving a firearm
to trigger this section.
We agree. The relevant portion of section 76-3-203(4) is as
follows, with our emphases:
A person who has been convicted of a
felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for
an indeterminate term as follows:
(4) Any person who has been sentenced to
a term of imprisonment for a felony in which
a firearm was used . . . and is convicted of
another felony when a firearm was used • . .
shall, in addition to any other sentence
imposed, be sentenced for an indeterminate
term to be not less than five nor more than
ten years to run consecutively and not
concurrently.
We interpret a statute "according to its literal wording
unless it would be unreasonably confusing or inoperable. It is
presumed that a statute^ is valid and that the words and phrases
used were chosen carefully and advisedly.11 Amax Magnesium Corp.
v. Tax Comm'n. 796 P.2d 1256, 1258 (Utah 1990); accord Gleave v.
Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co.. 749 P.2d 660, 672 (Utah App.),
cert, denied. 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). We independently review
a trial court's interpretation of statutory law for error. State
v. James. 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991).
Given our assumption that the legislature chose carefully
and advisedly the terms ••sentenced11 and "convicted," we reject
the State's contention that pursuant to this statute, "defendant
was not convicted of either crime until he received his
sentence.91 We hold that the legislature meant that a court may
impose the five-year firearm penalty only where a defendant has
first been sentenced in a firearm felony case and then is
convicted of another firearm felony. See State v. Archuletta.

920379-CA
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526 P.2d 911, 912 (Utah 1974) ("there is nothing to construe
where there is no ambiguity in the statute").
We therefore reverse the five year enhancement portion of
Ewell's^enfcence and affirxiuthe court's order in all other

Btf^nal W. Garff# Judg

Jackson, Judge (concurring):
I concur with the result reached today. However, I write
separately to point out that the term "convicted," as used in
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(4) (1990), means the establishment of
guilt, not the imposition of the judgment and sentence upon a
finding of guilt. While I recognize that the word "convicted"
is used in either context in various statutes and procedural
rules,1 it is apparent that the legislature used the term
1. The word "conviction" is capable of conveying two meanings.
First, "conviction" has a common meaning indicating a finding of
guilt. See State v. Stewart. 171 P.2d 383, 385 (Utah 1946) (a
plea of guilty amounts to a "conviction"); State v. Garcia. 659
P.2d 918, 923 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) ("conviction" refers to a
finding of guilt and does not include the imposition of a
sentence in the statute at issue); State v. Smith. 677 P.2d 715,
716 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (entry of judgment of conviction is not
equivalent to a conviction for purposes of this statute), cert.
denied. 691 P.2d 89 (1984); State v. Wimmer. 449 N.W.2d 621, 622
(Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (the word "conviction" in common language
and sometimes in statutes signifies the finding that a person is
guilty); State v. Kellv. 582 P.2d 891, 894 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978)
(a "conviction" is a finding of guilt, as distinguished from the
judgment and sentence, for purposes of our habitual criminal
statute); Sands v. State. 262 A.2d 583, 588 (Md. Ct. App. 1970)
("conviction" and "sentence" are legally distinct with
"conviction" being the determination of guilt and "sentence"
being the judgment entered).
Second, the word "conviction" has a more technical meaning
referring to the entire criminal procedural process, including
the judgment and sentence. See State v. Duncan. 812 P.2d 60, 64
(Utah App. 1991) ("it is the final judgment of the court on a
guilty verdict or plea that constitutes a conviction for
(continued...)

920379-CA

6

"convicted" in the enhancement statute at issue to mean the
establishment of guilt.
The legislature chose to require that a person be
"sentenced" to a term of imprisonment and then be "convicted" of
another felony using a firearm before the enhanced penalty would
be imposed. If the legislature had intended the word "convicted"
to include the sentencing portion of the criminal procedure, it
would have used the term "sentenced" twice rather than
"sentenced" and then "convicted."
Further, several courts, interpreting the word "conviction"
in statutes involving enhanced penalties for repeat offenders,
use the more common definition of conviction, namely, the
establishment of guilt by plea, jury verdict or finding of the
court. See People v. Lindsay. 57 Cal. Rptr. 190, 193 (Cal Ct.
App. 1964); Marcum v. State. 154 N.E.2d 376, 377-78 (Ind. 1958);
State v. Kramer. 235 N.W.2d 114, 115-16 (la. 1975); State v.
Smith. 650 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Burk,
680 P.2d 980 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984); Padilla v. State. 568 P.2d
190, 192 (N.M. 1977); State v. Dassincrer. 294 N.W.2d 926, 928
(S.D. 1980); State v. Kellv. 582 P.2d 891, 894 (1978). These
courts do not include the imposition of the sentence in the
definition of "conviction." Ig.
This definition also comports with the purpose of repeat
offender enhancement statutes—to discourage continued criminal
conduct by imposing a higher criminal penalty for a second
similar offense. See Moore v. Missouri. 159 U.S. 673, 677, 16 S.
Ct. 179, 40 L.Ed. 301 (1895). Twisting the meaning of the word
"conviction" to include sentencing would thwart that purpose in
cases such as the one before us. "A statute designed to punish a
second offender more severely when he has not learned from the
1. (••.continued)
impeachment purposes under Rule 609(a)(1)"); State v. Akana. 706
P.2d 1300, 1303 (Haw. 1985) (a more technical definition of
"conviction" includes a judgment or sentence rendered pursuant to
an ascertainment of guilt); Department of Transp. v. Edwards, 519
A.2d 1083, 1084 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983) ("conviction" occurs when
there is a finding of guilt and the sentence is imposed); Garcia
v. State Bd. of Educ. 694 P.2d 1371, 1374 (1984) ("conviction"
in its technical legal sense means final consummation of
prosecution including judgment or sentence rendered pursuant to a
verdict, confession, or plea of guilty), cert, denied. 694 P.2d
1358 (1985); Wimmer. 449 N.W.2d at 622 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (the
term "conviction" as used in statutes can include a judgment and
sentence of the court upon a verdict or confession of guilt)•
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penalty imposed for his prior offense should not be construed to
apply before that penalty has had the chance to have the desired
effect on the offender-" United States v. Abreu. 962 F.2d 1447,
1452-53 (10th Cir. 1992). Accordingly, for purposes of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-203(4), it is logical that we find a defendant
"convicted" upon the establishment of guilt, not upon sentencing.

Norman H. Jackson, Sudge

BENCH, Judge (dissenting in part):
I concur in the result the main opinion reaches on the juror
issue. I respectfully dissent, however, from the reversal of the
trial court's application of the firearm enhancement statute,
Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-203(4) (1990).
Defendant was charged, in one information, with one count of
aggravated robbery. In a second unrelated information, he was
charged with one count of aggravated robbery, one count of theft,
and one count of theft by deception. The first case was tried to
a jury on December 12-13, 1991. The jury found defendant guilty
as charged. Defendant later pleaded guilty to one count of
aggravated robbery in the other information. The counts of theft
and theft by deception were dismissed.
On February 28, 1992, the court sentenced defendant. First,
the court sentenced and convicted defendant on the jury verdict.
Next, the court sentenced and convicted defendant on the guilty
plea. Finally, the court determined that it was required to
impose the penalty enhancement under section 76-3-203(4), and
sentenced defendant to an additional five years.
Section 76-3-203(4) states, in relevant part:
A person who has been convicted of a
felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for
an indeterminate term as follows:
(4) Any person who has been sentenced to
a term of imprisonment for a felony in which
a firearm was used • • • and is convicted of
another felony when a firearm was used . . •
shall, in addition to any other sentence
imposed, be sentenced for an indeterminate
term to be not less then five nor more then
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ten years to run consecutively and not
concurrently.
(Emphasis added.) In reversing the enhancement imposed under
this statute, my colleagues erroneously hold that a conviction
precedes a sentence.
A "conviction" is referred to in our rules as a "judgment of
conviction" and includes "the plea or verdict, if any, and the
sentence." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(c) (1993).! See also State v.
Duncan. 812 P.2d 60, 62 (Utah App.) ("*conviction' refers to the
final judgment entered on the plea or verdict of guilty"), cert.
denied 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991) .2 Thus, under our rules, it is
not possible to be convicted without first being sentenced. The
sentence is part of the conviction.
Under section 76-3-203(4), all that is required for
enhancement is that a person must have been sentenced for a
felony involving a firearm, and then be convicted of another
felony also involving a firearm.3 The State correctly asserts
that "defendant was not convicted of either crime until he
received his sentence."
Defendant was sentenced and convicted of two separate
unrelated crimes on the same day. At the time defendant was
sentenced and convicted on the guilty plea, he had already been
sentenced and convicted on the jury verdict. It does not make
any analytical or logical difference that he was sentenced for
the previous crime only moments before. The fact remains that he
1.

Rule 22(c) states, in pertinent part:
Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea
of no contest, the court shall impose
sentence and shall enter a judgment of
conviction which shall include the plea or
the verdict, if any, and the sentence.

2. Our decision in this case must
have defined the term "conviction"
the term. It is short-sighted for
some purposes conviction means one
it means something else.

not turn on how other states
but on how Utah has defined
this court to suggest that for
thing and for other purposes

3. There is nothing in our statute to support the notion, as
proposed by the concurring opinion, that the purpose of this
statute is to give a defendant who has been sentenced for a
felony involving a firearm an opportunity to think about the
possibility of a more severe sentence before committing a second
similar offense.
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was "sentenced"
"convicted" for
trial court was
sentence should

for a crime involving a firearm and then
a second crime involving a firearm. Thus, the
correct in its assessment that defendant's
be enhanced pursuant to section 76-3-203(4).

The trial court did err, however, in imposing the
enhancement for a fixed five-year term. As conceded by the
State, section 76-3-203(4) actually provides that the enhancement
for a subsequent conviction shall be "for an indeterminate term
to be not less than five nor more than ten years[.]" Therefore,
while the trial court properly determined that defendant's
sentence should be enhanced, it erred in not sentencing defendant
to an indeterminate term.
I would therefore uphold the trial court's application of
section 76-3-203(4), and correct the enhancement of defendant's
sentence to provide for an indeterminate term.

Russell W. Bench, Judge
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ADDENDUM B

76-3-203. Felony conviction — Indeterminate term of imprisonment — Increase of sentence if firearm
used.
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as follows:
(1) In the case of a felony of thefirstdegree, for a term at not less than
five years, unless otherwise specifically provided by law, and which may
be for life but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the
representation of afirearmwas used in the commission or furtherance of
the felony, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court
may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate
term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently;
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree, for a term at not less
than one year nor more than 15 years but if the trier of fact finds a
firearm or a facsimile or the representation of afirearmwas used in the
commission or furtherance of the felony, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and
not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person
convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently;
(3) In the case of a felony of the third degree, for a term not to exceed
five years but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the
representation of afirearmwas used in the commission or furtherance of
the felony, the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for
an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and
not concurrently.
(4) Any person who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a
felony in which afirearmwas used or involved in the accomplishment of
the felony and is convicted of another felony when afirearmwas used or
involved in the accomplishment of the felony shall, in addition to any
other sentence imposed, be sentenced for an indeterminate term to be not
less than five nor more than ten years to run consecutively and not concurrently.

